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Respondent was a senior manager and an officer in an office of petitioner
professional accounting partnership when she was proposed for partnership in 1982. She was neither offered nor denied partnership but instead her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year.
When the partnersin heroffice later refused to repropose her for partnership, she sued petitioner in Federal District under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act), charging that it had discriminated against
her on the basis of sex in its partnership decisions. The District Court
ruled in respondent’s favor on the question ofliability, holding that petitioner had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of sex by
consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments about her
that resulted from sex stereotyping. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Both courts held that an employer who hasallowed a discriminatory motive to play a’part in an employmentdecision must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that it would have madethe samedecision in the absence of discrimination, and that petitioner had not carried this burden.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
263 U. S. App. D. C. 821, 825 F. 2d 458, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded that when a plaintiff in a Title
VII case proves that her gender played a part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a findingofliability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the samedecision
even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account. The courts
below erred by requiring petitioner to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence. Pp. 7-28.
.
(a) The balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives
established by Title VII by eliminating certain bases for distinguishing
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among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of
choice is decisive in this case. The words “because of” in § 703(a)(1) of
the Act, which forbids an employer to make an adverse decision against
an employee “because of such individual’s . . . sex,” requires looking at

all of the reasons, both legitimate andillegitimate, contributing to the
decision at the time it is made. The preservation of employers’ freedom
of choice means that an employerwill not be liable if it can prove that, if
it had not taken genderinto account, it would have come to the same
decision. This Court’s prior decisions demonstrate that the plaintiff
who showsthat an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an
adverse employment decision thereby places the burden on the defendant to showthat it would have made the same decision in the absence of
the unlawful motive. Here, petitioner may not meet its burden by
merely showing that respondent’s interpersonal problems —abrasiveness
with staff members—constituted a legitimate reason for denying her
partnership; instead, petitioner must show that its legitimate reason,
standing alone, would have induced petitioner to deny respondent partnership. Pp. 8-22.
(b) Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII
cases, and one of these rules is that the parties need only prove their
case by a preponderance of the evidence. Pp. 22-25.
(c) The District Court's finding that sex stereotyping was permitted
to play a part in evaluating respondent as a candidate for partnership

was not clearly erroneous. This finding is not undermined bythe fact
that many of the suspect comments made about respondent were made
by partners who were supporters rather than detractors. Pp. 25-28.
JUSTICE WHITE, although concluding that the Court of Appeals erred
in requiring petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have reached the same employmentdecision in the absence of the
improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance
of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274, which sets forth the proper approach to causation in this
‘case, also concluded that the plurality here errs in seeming to require, at
least in most cases, that the employercarry its burden by submitting objective evidence that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation. Ina mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive
found would have been ample groundsfor the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the
legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof, and there is no spe-

cial requirement of objective evidence.- This would even moreplainly be

the case where the employerdenies anyillegitimate motive in the first

place but the courtfinds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors
motivated the adverse action. Pp. 1-3.

ere

orcas.

i

|

PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS

I

Syllabus
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, although agreeing that on the facts of this case,
the burden of persuasion should shift to petitioner to demonstrate by a
preponderanceof the evidence that it would have reached the samedecision absent consideration of respondent’s gender, and that this burden
shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation, concluded
that the plurality misreads Title VII’s substantive causation requirement to command burdenshifting if the employer’s decisional processis
“tainted” by awarenessof sex or race in any way, and therebyeffectively
eliminates the requirement. JUSTICE O’CONNORalso concludedthat the
burden shifting rule should be limited to cases such as the present in
which the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. Pp. 1-19.
(a) Contrary to the plurality’s conclusion, Title VII’s plain language
making it unlawful for an employer to undertake an adverse employment
action “because of” prohibited factors and the statute’s legislative history
demonstrate that a substantive violation only occurs when consideration
of an illegitimate criterion is the “but-for” cause of the adverseaction.
However, nothing in the language, history, or purpose of the statute

prohibits adoption of an evidentiary rule which places the burden ofpersuasion on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns would
have justified an adverse employment action wherethe plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substantial role in
the employmentdecision. Such a rule has been adopted in tort and
other analogous types of cases, where leaving the burden of proof on the
plaintiff to prove “but-for” causation would be unfair or contrary to the
deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care. Pp. 2-9.
(b) Although the burdenshifting rule adopted here departs from the
careful framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U. 8. 248—which clearly contemplate that an individual disparate treatmentplaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughoutthelitigation—
that departure is justified in cases such as the present where the plaintiff, having presented direct evidence that the employerplaced substantial, though unquantifiable, reliance on a forbidden factor in making an
employment decision, has taken herproofas far as it could go, such that
it is appropriate to require the defendant, which has created the uncertainty as to causation by considering the illegitimate criterion, to show
that its decision would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns.
Moreover, a rule shifting the burdenin these circumstances will not conflict with other Title VII policies, particularly its prohibition on preferential treatment based on prohibited factors. Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. ——, distinguished. Pp. 9-15.
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(c) Thus, in orderto justify shifting the burden on the causation issue
to the defendant, a disparate treatmentplaintiff must show bydirectevidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on anillegitimate criterion in reaching their decision. Such a showingentitles
the factfinder to presume that the employer’s discriminatory animus
made a difference in the outcome, and, if the employerfails to carry its
burdenof persuasion, to conclude that the employer’s decision was made
“because of” consideration of the illegitimate factor, thereby satisfying
the substantive standard for liability under Title VII. This burden
shifting rule supplements the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework,
which continues to apply where theplaintiff has failed to satisfy the
threshold standard set forth herein. Pp. 16-18.

BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., and O'CONNOR, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
SCALIA, J., joined.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 87-1167

PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER wv. ANN B.
HOPKINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 1, 1989]

JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENSjoin.
Ann Hopkins was a senior manager in an office of Price
Waterhouse when she was proposed for partnership in 1982.
She wasneither offered nor denied admission to the partnership; instead, her candidacy washeld for reconsideration the
following year. When the partners in her office later refused to repropose her for partnership, she sued Price
Waterhouse underTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., charging that the firm had discriminated against her on the basis of
sex in its decisions regarding partnership. Judge Gesell in
the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in her
favor on the question of liability, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (1985),
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed. 263 U.S. App. D. C. 321, 825 F. 2d 458 (1987).
Wegranted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts
of Appeals concerning the respective burdensof proofof a defendant and plaintiff in a suit under Title VII when it has
been shown that an employment decision resulted from a
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. 485 U.S.
—— (1988).
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At Price Waterhouse, a nationwide professional accounting
partnership, a senior manager becomesa candidate for partnership whenthe partnersin herlocal office submit her name
as acandidate. All of the other partnersin the firm are then
invited to submit written comments on each candidate—
either on a “long” or a “short” form, depending on the partner’s degree of exposure to the candidate. Not every partnerin the firm submits comments on every candidate. After
reviewing the comments and interviewing the partners who
submitted them, the firm’s Admissions Committee makes a

recommendation to the Policy Board. This recommendation
will be either that the firm accept the candidate for partnership, put her application on “hold,” or deny her the promotion
outright. The Policy Board then decides whether to submit
the candidate’s name to the entire partnership for a vote, to
“hold” her candidacy, or to reject her. The recommendation
of the Admissions Committee, and the decision of the Policy
Board, are not controlled by fixed guidelines: a certain number of positive comments from partners will not guarantee a
candidate’s admission to the partnership, nor will a specific
quantity of negative comments necessarily defeat her application. Price Waterhouse places no limit on the numberof
persons whom it will admit to the partnership in any given
year.
Ann Hopkins had worked at Price Waterhouse’s Office of
Government Services in Washington, D. C., for five years
whenthe partnersin that office proposed her as a candidate
for partnership. Of the 662 partnersat the firm at that time,
7 were women. Of the 88 persons proposed for partnership
that year, only 1—Hopkins—was a woman. Forty-seven of
these candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21 were
rejected, and 20—including Hopkins—were “held” for reconsideration the following year.' Thirteen of the 32 part‘Before the time for reconsideration came, two of the partners in Hopkins’ office withdrew their support for her, and the office informed her that
she would not be reconsidered for partnership. Hopkins then resigned.
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ners who had submitted comments on Hopkins supported her
bid for partnership. Three partners recommended that her
candidacy be placed on hold, eight stated that they did not
have an informed opinion about her, and eight recommended
that she be denied partnership.
In a jointly prepared statement supporting her candidacy,
the partners in Hopkins’ office showcased her successful 2year effort to secure a $25 million contract with the Department of State, labeling it “an outstanding performance” and

one that Hopkinscarried out “virtually at the partnerlevel.”
Plaintiff’s Exh. 15. Despite Price Waterhouse’s attempt at
trial to minimize her contribution to this project, Judge Gesell specifically found that Hopkins had “played a key role in
Price Waterhouse’s successful effort to win a multi-million

dollar contract with the Department of State.” 618 F.
Supp., at 1112. Indeed, he went on, “{nJone of the other
partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a
comparable record in terms of successfully securing major
contracts for the partnership.” Jbid.
The partners in Hopkins’ office praised her character as
well as her accomplishments, describing her in their joint
statement as “an outstanding professional” who had a “deft
touch,” a “strong character, independence and integrity.”
Plaintiff’s Exh. 15. Clients appear to have agreed with
these assessments.

At trial, one official from the State De-

partment described her as “extremely competent, intelligent,” “strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and

creative.” Tr. 150. Another high-ranking official praised
Hopkins’ decisiveness, broadmindedness, and “intellectual

Price Waterhouse does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
the refusal to repropose her for partnership amounted to a constructive
discharge. That court remandedthecase to the District Court for further
proceedings to determine appropriate relief, and those proceedings have
been stayed pending our decision. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 3. We are
concerned today only with Price Waterhouse’s decision to place Hopkins’
candidacy on hold. Decisions pertaining to advancement to partnership
are, of course, subject to challenge under Title VII.

Spalding, 467 U. S. 69 (1984).

Hishon v. King &
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clarity”; she was, in his words, “a stimulat
ing conversational-

ist.” Id., at 156-157. Evaluations such
as these led Judge
Gesell to conclude that Hopkins “had no diffi
culty dealing
with clients and herclients appear to have
been very pleased
with her work” and that she “was generall
y viewed as a
highly competent project leader who work
ed long hours,
pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and
demanded much
from the multidisciplinary staffs with whic
h she worked.”
618 F. Supp., at 1112-1113.
On too many occasions, however, Hopkins’ aggr
essiveness
apparently spilled over into abrasiveness.
Staff members
seem to have borne the brunt of Hopkins’
brusqueness.
Longbefore herbid for partnership, partners
evaluating her
work had counseled her to improveherrelat
ions with staff
members. Although later evaluations indic
ate an improvement, Hopkins’ perceived shortcomings in
this important
area eventually doomedherbid for partners
hip. Virtually
all of the partners’ negative remarks about
Hopkins —even
those of partners supporting her—had to do
with her “interpersonal skills.” Both “[s]upporters and oppo
nents of her
candidacy,” stressed Judge Gesell, “indicat
ed that she was
sometimesoverly aggressive, unduly harsh, diffi
cult to work
with and impatient with staff.” Id., at 1113.
There wereclear signs, though, that some of
the partners
reacted negatively to Hopkins’ personality beca
use she was a
woman. Onepartner described her as “macho”
(Defendant’s
Exh. 30); another suggested that she “overcom
pensated for
being a woman”(Defendant’s Exh. 31); a third
advised herto
take “a course at charm school” (Defendant’s
Exh. 27). Sev-

eral partnerscriticized her use of profanity;
in response, one

partner suggested that those partners objected
to her swearing only “becauseit[’]s a lady using foul language
.” Tr. 321.
Another supporter explained that Hopkins
“ha[d] matured
from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard
-nosed mer to
an authoritative, formidable, but much more
appealing lady

ptr candidate.”

Defendant’s Exh. 27.

But it was the mar
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who, as Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for explaining
to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board’s decision to
place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace:
in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas
Beyer advised, Hopkins should “walk more femininely, talk

more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have

her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” 618 F. Supp., at 1117.
Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University, testified
at trial that the partnership selection process at Price
Waterhouse waslikely influenced by sex stereotyping. Her
testimony focused not only on the overtly sex-based comments of partners but also on gender-neutral remarks, made
by partners who knew Hopkinsonly slightly, that were intensely critical of her. One partner, for example, baldly
stated that Hopkins was “universally disliked” by staff (De-

fendant’s Exh. 27), and another described her as “consist-

ently annoying andirritating” (ibid.); yet these were people
who had had verylittle contact with Hopkins. According to
Fiske, Hopkins’ uniqueness (as the only womaninthe pool of
candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it
likely that sharply critical remarks such as these were the
product of sex stereotyping—although Fiske admitted that
she could not say with certainty whether any particular comment wasthe result of stereotyping. Fiske based her opinion on a review of the submitted comments, explaining that it
was commonly accepted practice for social psychologists to
reach this kind of conclusion without having met any of the
people involved in the decisionmaking process.
In previous years, other female candidates for partnership
also had been evaluated in sex-based terms. As a general

matter, Judge Gesell concluded, “[clandidates were viewed

favorably if partners believed they maintained their feminlinlity while becoming effective professional managers”; in

this environment, “[t]o be identified as a ‘women’s lib[bler’

was regarded as [a] negative comment.”

618 F. Supp., at

6
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1117. In fact, the judge found that in previous years “[o]ne
partner repeatedly commentedthat he could not consider any
womanseriously as a partnership candidate and believed that
womenwerenot even capable of functioning as senior managers—yet the firm took noaction to discourage his comments
and recordedhis vote in the overall summaryof the evaluations.”

.
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Ibid.

Judge Gesell found that Price Waterhouse legitimately emphasized interpersonalskills in its partnership decisions, and
also found that the firm had not fabricated its complaints
about Hopkins’ interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, he concluded, the firm did not give
decisive emphasis to such traits only because Hopkins was a
woman; although there were male candidates who lacked
these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge
found that these candidates possessed other, positive traits
that Hopkins lacked.
The judge went on to decide, however, that some of the
partners’ remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and
that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance
on such comments. Heheld that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkinsonthebasis of sex by
consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments
that resulted from sex stereotyping. Noting that Price
Waterhouse could avoid equitable relief by proving by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have placed Hopkins’
candidacy on hold even absent this discrimination, the judge
decided that the firm had not carried this heavy burden.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District court’s ultimate
conclusion, but departed from its analysis in oneparticular:it
held that evenif a plaintiff proves that discrimination played
a role in an employment decision, the defendant will not be
found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence,
that it would have made the samedecision in the absenceof
discrimination. 263 U.S. App. D. C., at 333-334, 825 F. 2d,
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at 470-471. Under this approach, an employer is not
deemedto haveviolated Title VII if it proves that it would
have madethe samedecision in the absence of an impermissible motive, whereas underthe District Court’s approach, the
employer’s proof in that respect only avoids equitable relief.
Wedecide today that the Court of Appeals had the better approach, but that both courts erred in requiring the employer
to makeits proof by clear and convincing evidence.
IT
The specification of the standard of causation underTitle
VII is a decision about the kind of conduct that violates that
statute.

According to Price Waterhouse, an employer vio-

lates Title VII onlyif it gives decisive consideration to an employee’s gender, race, national origin, or religion in making a
decision that affects that employee. On Price Waterhouse’s
theory, even if a plaintiff shows that her genderplayed a part
in an employmentdecision, it is still her burden to show that
the decision would have been different if the employer had
not discriminated. In Hopkins’ view, on the other hand, an
employerviolates the statute wheneverit allows one of these
attributes to play any part in an employmentdecision. Once
a plaintiff shows that this occurred, according to Hopkins,
the employer’s proof that it would have madethe same decision in the absenceof discrimination can serveto limit equitable relief but not to avoid a findingof liability.2 We conclude
that, as often happens, the truth lies somewhere in-between.
*This question has, to say the least, left the Circuits in disarray. The
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require a plaintiff challenging
an adverse employment decision to showthat, but for her gender(or race
or religion or national origin), the decision would have been in her favor.
See, e. g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F. 2d 175, 179
(CA8 1985), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1035 (1986); Ross v. Communications

Satellite Corp., 759 F. 2d 355, 365-366 (CA4 1985); Peters v.City of Shreve-

port, 818 F. 2d 1148, 1161 (CA5 1987); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education

Assn. Council, 830 F. 2d 659, 664-665 (CA7 1987).

The First, Second,

Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold that oncethe plaintiff

8
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In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but mo-

mentous announcementthat sex, race, religion, and national
origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or com-

pensation of employees.* Yet, the statute does not purport
to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers
may take into account in making employment decisions.
has shown that a discriminatory motive wasa “substantial” or “motivating”
factor in an employment decision, the employer may avoid a findingofliability only by proving that it would have madethe same decision even in
the absence of discrimination. These courts have either specified that the
employer must prove its case by a preponderanceof the evidence or have
not mentioned the proper standard of proof. See, e. g., Fields v. Clark
University, 817 F. 2d 931, 936-937 (CA1 1987) (“motivating factor”); Berl
v. Westchester County, 849 F. 2d 712, 714-715 (CA2 1988) (“substantial
part”); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, Ky., 825 F. 2d 111, 115
(CA6 1987) (“motivating factor”); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715
F. 2d 1552, 1557 (CA11 1983). The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit,
as shownin this case, follows the same rule except that it requires that the
employer’s proof be clear and convincing rather than merely preponderant.
263 U.S. App. D. C. 321, 333-334, 825 F. 2d 458, 470-471 (1987); see also
Toney v. Block, 227 U. S. App. D. C. 278, 275, 705 F. 2d 1364, 1366 (1988)
(Sealia, J.) Gt would be “destructive of the purposesof [Title VII] to require the plaintiff to establish ... the difficult hypothetical proposition
that, had there been no discrimination, the employment decision would
have been madein his favor”). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
also requires clear and convincing proof, but it goes further by holding that
a Title VII violation is made out as soon asthe plaintiff shows that an impermissible motivation played a part in an employment decision—at which
point the employer may avoid reinstatement and an award of backpay by
proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
unlawful motive. See, e. g. Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco,
741 F. 2d 1163, 1165-1166 (CA9 1984) (Kennedy, J.) (“significant factor”).
Last, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit draws the samedistinction as the Ninth betweentheliability and remedial phases of Title VII litigation, but requires only a preponderance of the evidence from the employer. See, e. g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F. 2d 1818, 1820-1824 (CA8 1985)
(en bane) (“discernible factor”).

*We disregard, for purposes of this discussion, the special context of
affirmative action.
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The converse, therefore, of “for cause” legislation,’ Title VII
eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees
while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of choice.
This balance between employeerights and employer prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us.
Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender into
account in making employment decisions appears on the face
of the statute. In now-familiar language, the statute forbids
an employerto “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,”
or to “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s. . . sex.”

42 U.S. C. §§ 2000e—2(a)(1), (2)

(emphasis added). We take these words to mean that
gender mustbe irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words “becauseof”as colloquial shorthandfor “butfor causation,” as does Price Waterhouse, is to misunder‘Congress specifically declined to require that an employment decision
have been “for cause” in order to escape an affirmative penalty (such as
reinstatement or backpay) from a court.

As introduced in the House, the

bill that became Title VII forbade such affirmative relief if an “individual
was ... refused employment or advancement, or was suspended ordischarged for cause.” H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 77 (1963) (emphasis
added). The phrase “for cause” eventually was deleted in favor of the
phrase “for any reason other than” one of the enumerated characteristics.

See 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964).

Representative Celler explained

that this substitution “specif[ied] cause”; in his view, a court “cannot find

any violation of the act which is based on facts other . . . than discrimina-

tion on the groundsof race, color, religion, or national origin.”

Jd., at

2567.
°In this Court, Hopkinsfor the first time argues that Price Waterhouse
violated § 703(a)(2) when it subjected her to a biased decisionmaking process that “tended to deprive” a woman of partnership on the basis of her
sex. Since Hopkins did not make this argument below, we do not address
it.

10
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stand them.°
But-for causation is a hypothetical construct. In determining whethera particular factor was a but-for cause of a
given event, we begin by assuming that that factor was

present at the time of the event, and then ask whether, even
if that factor had been absent, the event nevertheless would

have transpired in the same way.

The present, active tense

of the operative verbs of §703(a)(1) (“to fail or refuse”), in
contrast, turns our attention to the actual moment of the

event in question, the adverse employment decision. The
critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of
§ 703(a)(1), is whether genderwasa factor in the employment
decision at the moment it was made. Moreover, since we
know that the words “because of” do not mean “solely because of,”’ we also know that Title VII meant to condemn

even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate andillegitimate considerations. When, therefore, an employer
considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of
making a decision, that decision was “because of” sex and the
other, legitimate considerations —evenif we maysay later, in
the context of litigation, that the decision would have been
the same if gender had not been taken into account.
°’We made passing reference to a similar question in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. 8. 278, 282, n. 10 (1976), where
we stated that when a Title VII plaintiff seeks to show that an employer’s
explanation for a challenged employment decision is pretextual, “no more
is required to be shown than that race was a ‘but for’ cause.” This passage, however, does not suggest that the plaintiff must show but-for cause;
it indicates only that if she does so, she prevails. More important, McDonald dealt with the question whether the employer’s stated reason for
its decision was the reasonforits action; unlike the case before us today,
therefore, McDonald did not involve mixed motives.

This difference is

decisive in distinguishing this case from those involving “pretext.” See
infra, at 16.
7Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have placed
the word “solely” in front of the words “because of.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2728,
13837 (1964).
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To attribute this meaning to the words “because of” does

not, as the dissent asserts, post, at 4, divest them of causal

significance. A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and
supposethat either force acting alone would have moved the
object. As the dissent would have it, neither physical force
was a “cause” of the motion unless we can show that but for
one or both of them, the object would not have moved; to use
the dissent’s terminology, both forces were simply “in the
air” unless we can identify at least one of them as a but-for
cause of the object’s movement. Post, at 13. Events that

are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have

any “cause”at all. This cannot beso.
Weneednot leave our commonsenseat the doorstep when
weinterpret a statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that,
in the simple words “becauseof,” Congress meant to obligate
a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played bylegitimate andillegitimate motivations in the employmentdecision
she challenges.

Weconclude, instead, that Congress meant

to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sexbased considerations in comingtoits decision.
Our interpretation of the words “because of”also is supported by the fact that Title VII does identify one circum-

stance in which an employer may take genderinto account in
making an employment decision, namely, when gender is
a

“bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business
or enterprise.” 42 U.S. C. §2000e-2(e). The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other
circumstances, a person’s gender may not be considered in
makingdecisions that affect her. Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block to

employment opportunities.

An employer may not, we have

held, condition employment opportunities on the satisfaction
of facially neutral tests or qualifications that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on members of protected groups
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when those tests or qualifications are not required for performance of the job. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U. S. —— (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U. S. 424 (1971).
To say that an employer may not take gender into account
is not, however, the end of the matter, for that describes only
one aspect of Title VII. The other important aspect of the
statute is its preservation of an employer’s remaining freedom of choice. We conclude that the preservation of this
freedom means that an employershall not beliable if it can
prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular
person. The statute’s maintenance of employer prerogatives is evident from the statute itself and from its history,
both in Congress and in this Court.
To begin with, the existence of the BFOQ exception shows
Congress’ unwillingness to require employers to change the
very nature of their operations in response to the statute.
And our emphasis on “business necessity” in disparateimpact cases, see Watson and Griggs, and on “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason[s]” in disparate-treatment cases,
see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U. S. 248 (1981), results from our awareness of Title VII’s

balance between employee rights and employerprerogatives.
In McDonnell Douglas, we described as follows Title VII’s
goal to eradicate discrimination while preserving workplace
efficiency: “The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer,isefficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personneldecisions. In the implementation of
such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”

411 U. S., at

801.
When an employer ignored the attributes enumerated in
the statute, Congress hoped, it naturally would focus on the
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qualifications of the applicant or employee. The intent to
drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than on
race, religion, sex, or national origin is the theme of a good
deal of the statute’s legislative history. An interpretive
memorandum entered into the Congressional Record by Senators Case and Clark, comanagersof the bill in the Senate, is

representative of this general theme.* According to their
memorandum, Title VII “expressly protects the employer’s
right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or
white, must meet the applicable job qualifications. Indeed,
the very purposeoftitle VII is to promotehiring on the basis
of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or
color.”® 110 Cong. Rec. 7247 (1964), quoted in Griggs v.

Duke Power Co., supra, at 484. The memorandum wenton:
“To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference
in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in

treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are
those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria:

race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.

Anyother cri-

*Wehave in the past acknowledged the authoritativeness of this interpretive memorandum, written by the two bipartisan “captains” of Title
VII. See, e. g., Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, 581, n. 14 (1984).
*Manyofthe legislators’ statements, such as the memorandum quoted

in text, focused specifically on race rather than on genderorreligion or national origin. We do not, however,limit their statements to the context of

race, but instead we take them as general statements on the meaning of
Title VII. The somewhat bizarre path by which “sex” cameto be included
as a forbidden criterion for employment —it was included in an attempt to
defeat the bill, see C. & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative
History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 115-117 (1985)—does not persuade us
that the legislators’ statements pertaining to race are irrelevant to cases
alleging gender discrimination. The amendment that added “sex” as one
of the forbidden criteria for employment was passed, of course, and the
statute on its face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the

same.
By the sametoken, our specific references to gender throughout this

opinion, and the principles we announce, apply with equal force to dis-

crimination based on race, religion, or national origin.
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terion or qualification for employmentis not affected by this
title.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).
Manyotherlegislators made statementsto a similar effect;
we see no need to set out each remarkin full here. The central point is this: while an employer may not take genderinto
account in making an employmentdecision (except in those
very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ), it is
free to decide against a womanfor other reasons. Wethink
these principles require that, once a plaintiff in a Title VII
case shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding ofliability” only by proving that it would have made the same
Hopkins argues that once she madethis showing, she wasentitled to a
finding that Price Waterhouse had discriminated against her on the basis of
sex; as a consequence, she says, the partnership’s proof could only limit the
relief she received. She relies on Title VII’s § 706(g), which permits a
court to awardaffirmative relief when it finds that an employer “has intentionally engagedin oris intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice,” and yet forbids a court to order reinstatementof, or backpayto,
“an individual . . . if such individual was refused . . . employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on accountofrace, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S. C. §2000-5(g) (emphasis added). We do not take this provision to

mean that a court inevitably can find a violation of the statute without having considered whether the employment decision would have been the
same absent the impermissible motive. That would be to interpret
§ 706(g)—a provision defining remedies—to influence the substantive commandsof the statute. We think that this provision merely limits courts’
authority to award affirmative relief in those circumstances in which violation of the statute is not dependent upon the effect of the employer’s
discriminatory practices on a particular employee, as in pattern-or-practice
suits and class actions. “The crucial difference between an individual’s
claim of discrimination anda class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry regarding an individual’s
claim is the reason for aparticular employmentdecision, while ‘at the liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking.’”
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 876 (1984),
quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 360, n. 46 (1977).
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decision evenif it had not allowed genderto play such a role.
This balance of burdensis the direct result of Title VII’s balance of rights.

Our holding casts no shadow on Burdine, in which wedecided that, even after a plaintiff has made out a primafacie
case of discrimination under Title VII, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that its stated
legitimate reason for the employmentdecision was the true

reason.

450 U.S., at 256-258.

Westress, first, that nei-

ther court below shifted the burden of persuasion to Price

Waterhouse on this question, and in fact, the District Court

found that Hopkins had not shownthatthe firm’s stated reason for its decision was pretextual. 618 F. Supp., at
1114-1115. Moreover, since we hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the issue whether gender
played a part in the employment decision, the situation before usis not the oneof “shifting burdens” that we addressed
in Burdine. Instead, the employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must
persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer,
if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another. See
NLEBv. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393,
400 (1983)."
Without explicitly mentioning this portion of § 706(g), we have in the
past held that Title VII does not authorize affirmative relief for individuals
as to whom, the employer shows, the existence of systemic discrimination
had no effect. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. 8. 747,
772 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 481 U. S. 324, 367-371 (1977); East

Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 481 U. S. 395, 404, n. 9
(1977). These decisions suggest that the proper focus of § 706(g) is on

claims of systemic discrimination, not on chargesof individual discrimina-

tion.

Cf. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 398

(1983) (upholding the National Labor Relations Board’s identical interpretation of § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c),

which contains language almostidentical to § 706(g)).
“Given that both the plaintiff and defendant bear a burden of proofin
cases such asthis one, it is surprising that the dissent insists that our ap-

proach requires the employer to bear “the ultimate burden of proof.”

ll
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Price Waterhouse’s claim that the employer does not bear
any burdenof proof (if it bears oneat all) until the plaintiff
has shown “substantial evidence that Price Waterhouse’s explanation for failing to promote Hopkins was not the ‘true
reason’ for its action” (Brief for Petitioner 20) merely re-

states its argument that the plaintiff in a mixed-motives case
must squeeze her proof into Burdine’s framework. Where a
decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask

whether the legitimate reason was “the ‘true reason’”(Brief
for Petitioner 20 (emphasis added)) for the decision—whichis

the question asked by Burdine. See Transportation Management, supra, at 400, n. 5.” Oblivious to this last point,
Post, at 10. It is, moreover, perfectly consistent to say both that gender
wasa factor in a particular decision when it was made and that, when the

situation is viewed hypothetically and after the fact, the same decision

would have been made evenin the absenceof discrimination.

Thus, we do

not see the “internal inconsistency” in our opinion that the dissent perceives. See post, at 6-7. Finally, whereliability is imposed because an
employer is unable to prove that it would have made the same decision

evenif it had not discriminated, this is not an imposition ofliability “where

sex made no difference to the outcome.” Post, at 6. In our adversary
system, where a party has the burdenof proving a particular assertion and
where that party is unable to meet its burden, we assumethat that assertion is inaccurate. Thus, where an employeris unable to proveits claim
that it would have made the samedecision in the absenceof discrimination,
we are entitled to conclude that gender did make a difference to the
outcome.
” Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be
correctly labeled as either a “pretext” case or a “mixed motives” case from

the beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often
will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both.

Discovery often

will be necessary before the plaintiff can know whetherboth legitimate and
illegitimate considerations played a part in the decision against her. At
some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide
whethera particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to
satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden charac-

teristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail

only if she proves, following Burdine, that the employer’s stated reason for
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the dissent would insist that Burdine’s framework perform
work that it was never intended to perform. It would require a plaintiff who challenges an adverse employmentdecision in which both legitimate andillegitimate considerations
played a part to pretend that the decision, in fact, stemmed
from a single source—for the premise of Burdine is that
either a legitimate or anillegitimate set of considerations led
to the challenged decision. To say that Burdine’s evidentiary schemewill not help us decide a case admittedly involving both kinds of considerations is not to cast aspersions on
the utility of that scheme in the circumstances for which it
was designed.
B
In deciding as we do today, we do not traverse new
ground. Wehavein the past confronted Title VII cases in
which an employerhas used anillegitimate criterion to distinguish among employees, and haveheld that it is the employer’s burden to justify decisions resulting from that practice.
When an employer has asserted that genderis a bona fide

occupational qualification within the meaning of § 703(e), for

example, we have assumedthat it is the employer who must
show why it must use genderas a criterion in employment.
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. 8. 321, 332-337 (1977).
In a related context, although the Equal Pay Act expressly

permits employers to pay different wages to women where

disparate payis the result of a “factor other than sex,” see 29
U.S. C. §206(d)(1), we have decided that it is the employer,

not the employee, who must prove that the actual disparity is
its decision is pretextual.

The dissent need not worry that this eviden-

tiary scheme, if used during a jurytrial, will be so impossibly confused and
complex as it imagines. See, e. g., post, at 18-14. Juries long have de-

cided cases in which defendants raise affirmative defenses. The dissent
fails, moreover, to explain why the evidentiary scheme that we endorsed
over ten years ago in Mt. Healthy has not proved unworkable in that con-

text but would be hopelessly complicated in a case brought under federal

antidiscrimination statutes.
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not sex-linked.

See Corning Glass Wo
rks vy. Brennan, 417
Finally, some courts
have held that
underTitle VII as amen
dedby the Pregnancy
Di
scrimination
Act, it is the employer
who has the burden of
showingthat its
limitations on the work
that it allows a pregna
nt woman to
perform are necessary
in light of her pregnanc
y.
See,e. g.,
Hayes vy. Shelby Memo
rial Hospital, 726 F.
2q
1548, 1548
(CA11 1984): Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F, 24 117
2, 1187 (CA4
1982). As these exam
ples demonstrate, our
assumption aldecisionmaking process,
then it must carry the
burden of justifying its ultimate dec
ision. We have not
in the past required women whose
gender has proved rele
vant to an em| ployment decision to
establish the negative
pr
oposition that
they would not have
been subject to that dec
ision had they
been men, and we do
not do so today.
We have reached 4 sim
ilar conclusion in othe
r contexts
U.S. 188, 196 (1974)
,

would have occupied
had he do

ne nothing,” id., at
concluded that such an
285, we
employee “ought not to
be able, by engaging in such conduct,
to prevent his employer
from assessing his performance re
cord and reaching a dec
ision not to rehire on the basis of th
at record.” Id., at 286
. We therefore
held that once the plaint
iff had shown that his
constitutionally protected Speech wa
s a “substantial” or “m
ot
ivating factor” in the adverse trea
tmentof him by his empl
oyer, the employer was obligated
to prove “by a prepon
derance of the
evidence that it would
have reached the same
decision as to
[the plaintiff] even in
the absence ofthe prot
ected conduct.”
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Id., at 287. A court that finds for a plain
tiff under this
standardhaseffectively concluded that an illeg
itimate motive
was a “but-for” cause of the employment
decision. See
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Scho
ol District, 439
U.S. 410, 417 (1979). See also Arlington Heig
hts v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. 8. 252, 270271, n. 21 (1977)
(applying Mt. Healthy standard where plain
tiff alleged that
unconstitutional motive had contributed to
enactmentofleg-

islation); Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 228 (1985)
(same).

In Transportation Management, we upheld
the NLRB’s
interpretation of § 10(c) of the National Labo
r Relations Act,

which forbids a court to order affirmativ
e relief for discrimi-

natory conduct against a union member “if
such individual _
was suspended or discharged for caus
e.” 29 U.S. GC.
§160(c). The Board had decided that this
provision meant
that once an employee had shownthat his susp
ension ordischarge was based in part on hostility to unio
ns, it was up to
the employer to prove by a preponderanc
e of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision in
the absence of
this impermissible motive. In such a situa
tion, we emphasized, “[t]he employer is a wrongdoer; he has
acted out of a

motive that is declared illegitimate by the
statute.

It is fair

that he beartherisk that the influence of legal
and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he know
ingly created the
risk and becausethe risk was created not by
innocentactivity
but by his own wrongdoing.” 462 U. S., at
403.
Wehave, in short, been here before.

Each time, we have

concluded that the plaintiff who shows that
an impermissible
motive played a motivating part in an adve
rse employment
decision has thereby placed upon the defendan
t the burden to
show that it would have made the same deci
sion in the absence of the unlawful motive. Our decision
today treadsthis
well-worn path.
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In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we meanthat, if we asked the employerat
the momentof the decision what its reasons were and if we
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be
that the applicant or employee was a woman." In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer whoacts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.
Although the parties do not overtly dispute this last proposition, the placement by Price Waterhouseof “sex stereotyping” in quotation marks throughoutits brief seems to us an
insinuation either that such stereotyping was not present in
this case or that it lacks legal relevance. Wereject both possibilities. As to the existence of sex stereotyping in this
case, we are not inclined to quarrel with the District Court’s
conclusion that a number of the partners’ comments showed
sex stereotyping at work. See infra, at 25-26. As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or

insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for “‘[iIn forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
o

strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and womenresulting from sex stereotypes.’” Los Angeles

Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 485 U.S. 702, 707,
n. 13 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). An employer whoobjects to

* After comparing this description of the plaintiff’s proof to that offered
by the concurring opinion, post, at 16,, we do not understand whythe concurrence suggests that they are meaningfully different from each other,
see post, at 15, 17-18. Nor do we see how the inquiry that we have described is “hypothetical,” see post, at 5,n. 1. It seeks to determine the
content of the entire set of reasons for a decision, rather than shaving off
one reason in an attempt to determine what the decision would have been

in the absence of that consideration.

The inquiry that we describe thus

strikes us as a distinctly non-hypothetical one.

PRICE WATERHOUSEv. HOPKINS

21

aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this
trait places womenin an intolerable and impermissible Catch22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and outof a job if
they don’t. Title VII lifts women outof this bind.
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not
inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision. The plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.
In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly
be evidence that gender played a part. In any event, the
stereotyping in this case did not simply consist of stray remarks.
On the contrary, Hopkins proved that Price
Waterhouse invited partners to submit comments; that some
of the comments stemmed from sex stereotypes; that an important part of the Policy Board’s decision on Hopkins was an
assessment of the submitted comments; and that Price

Waterhouse in no way disclaimed reliance on the sex-linked
evaluations. This is not, as Price Waterhouse suggests,
“discrimination in the air”; rather, it is, as Hopkins putsit,
“discrimination brought to ground and visited upon” an employee. Brief for Respondent 30. By focusing on Hopkins’
specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the
possible waysof proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision, and werefrain from deciding here which specific facts, “standing alone,” would or
would not establish a plaintiff’s case, since such a decision is
unnecessary in this case.

But see post, at 17 (JUSTICE

O’CONNOR, concurring in judgment).
As to the employer’s proof, in most cases, the employer
should be able to present some objective evidence as toits
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive."
4 JUSTICE WHITE’s suggestion, post, at 3, that the employer’s owntesti-

mony as to the probable decision in the absence of discrimination is due
special credence where the court has, contrary to the employer’s testimony, found that an illegitimate factor played a part in the decision, is
baffling.

| <
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[iter proving “that the same decision would have been
justified . . . is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made.”

Givhan, 439 U.S., at 416,

‘ quoting Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District,
555 F. 2d 1309, 1815 (CA5 1977). An employer maynot, in
other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason
did not motivate it at the time of the decision. Finally, an
employer may not meet its burden in such a case by merely
showingthat at the timeof the decision it was motivated only
in part by a legitimate reason. The very premiseof a mixedmotives case is that a legitimate reason was present, and indeed, in this case, Price Waterhouse already has madethis

showing by convincing Judge Gesell that Hopkins’ interperVY | sonal problems werea legitimate concern. The employerinstead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone,
would have induced it to make the same decision.
III

Hi
|
|

(|
il |

HH |
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II)
HHH
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The courts below held that an employer who has allowed a
discriminatory impulse to play a motivating part in an employment decision must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the samedecision in the absence of discrimination. Weare persuadedthat the better
rule is that the employer must make this showing bya preponderanceof the evidence.
Conventionalrules ofcivil litigation generally apply in Title
VII cases, see, e. g., United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (discrimination

not to be “treat[ed] . . . differently from other ultimate ques-

tions of fact”), and oneof these rules is that parties to civil
litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of
the evidence. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 390 (1983). Exceptions to this standard

are uncommon, and in fact are ordinarily recognized only
when the governmentseeks to take unusualcoercive action—
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action more dramatic than entering an award of money damagesor other conventional relief—against an individual. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (1982) (termination
of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 427

(1979) Gnvoluntary commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U. 8S.
276 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 122, 125 (1943) (denaturalization). Only rarely

have we required clear and convincing proof where theaction
defended against seeks only conventional relief, see, €. g.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342 (1974) (defamation), and wefind it significant that in such cases it was
the defendant rather than the plaintiff who sought the elevated standard of proof—suggesting that this standard ordinarily serves asa shield rather than, as Hopkins seeks to use

it, as a sword.

It is true, as Hopkins emphasizes, that we have noted the
“clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage
and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix
the amount.” Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 562 (1981). Likewise, an EEOC
regulation does require federal agencies proved to haveviolated Title VII to show byclear and convincing evidence that
an individual employeeis notentitled to relief. See 29 CFR
§ 1613.271(c)(2) (1988).

And finally, it is true that we have

emphasized the importance of make-whole relief for victims
of discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975). Yet each of these sources deals with the
proper determination of relief rather than with the initial
finding of liability. This is seen most easily in the EEOC’s

regulation, which operates only after an agency or the EEOC
has found that “an employee of the agency wasdiscriminated
against.” See 29 CFR §1613.271(c) (1988). Because we

haveheld that, by proving that it would have made the same

decision in the absence of discrimination, the employer may

avoid a finding ofliability altogether and not simply avoid
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certain equitable relief, these authorities do not help Hopkins
to show why weshould elevate the standard of proof for an
employerin this position.
Significantly, the cases from this Court that most resemble
this one, Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management, did
not require clear and convincing proof. Mt. Healthy, 429
U.S., at 287; Transportation Management, 462 U.S., at
400, 403. Weare not inclined to say that the public policy
against firing employees because they spoke out on issues of
public concern or because theyaffiliated with a unionis less
important than the policy against discharging employees on
the basis of their gender. Each ofthese policies is vitally
important, and each is adequately served by requiring proof
by a preponderanceof the evidence.
Although Price Waterhouse doesnot concretely tell us how
its proof was preponderant evenif it was not clear and convineing, this general claim is implicit in its request for the
less stringent standard. Since the lower courts required
Price Waterhouse to make its proof by clear and convincing
evidence, they did not determine whether Price Waterhouse
had proved by a preponderanceof the evidence thatit would
have placed Hopkins’ candidacy on hold evenifit had not permitted sex-linked evaluations to play a part in the decisionmaking process. Thus, we shall remand this case so that
that determination can be made.
IV
The District Court found that sex stereotyping “was permitted to play a part” in the evaluation of Hopkinsas a candidate for partnership.
618 F. Supp., at 1120.
Price
Waterhouse disputes both that stereotyping occurred and
that it played any part in the decision to place Hopkins’candidacy on hold. In the firm’s view,in other words, the District
Court’s factual conclusions are clearly erroneous. Wedo not
agree.

Sy
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In finding that some of the partners’ comments reflected
sex stereotyping, the District Court relied in part on Dr.
Fiske’s expert testimony. Without directly impugning Dr.
Fiske’s credentials or qualifications, Price Waterhouse insinuates that a social psychologist is unable to identify sex
stereotyping in evaluations without investigating whether
those evaluations have a basis in reality. This argument
comes too late. At trial, counsel for Price Waterhouse twice
assured the court that he did not question Dr. Fiske’s expertise (App. 25) andfailed to challenge the legitimacyof herdiscipline.
Without contradiction from Price Waterhouse,
Fiske testified that she discerned sex stereotyping in the
partners’ evaluations of Hopkins and she further explained
that it was part of her business to identify stereotyping in

written documents.

Jd., at 64.

We are notinclined to ac-

cept petitioner’s belated and unsubstantiated characteriza-

tion of Dr. Fiske’s testimony as “gossamer evidence” (Brief

for Petitioner 20) based only on “intuitive hunches” (id., at
44) andof her detection of sex stereotyping as “intuitively divined” (id., at 43). Nor are we disposed to adopt the dissent’s dismissive attitude toward Dr. Fiske’s field of study

and toward her ownprofessional integrity, see post, at 15,
n. 5.

Indeed, we are tempted to say that Dr. Fiske’s expert testimony was merely icing on Hopkins’ cake. It takes no special training to discern sex stereotypingin a description of an
aggressive female employee as requiring “a course at charm
school.” Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer’s memorable advice
to Hopkins, does it require expertise in psychology to know
that, if an employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shadeoflipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills
that has drawnthecriticism.”
* Wereject the claim, advanced by Price Waterhouse here and by the
dissenting judge below,that the District Court clearly erred in finding that

Beyer was “responsible for telling [Hopkins] what problems the Policy
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Price Waterhouse also charges that Hopkins produced no
evidence that sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to
place her candidacy on hold. As we have stressed, however,
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations
from all of the firm’s partners; that it generally relied very
heavily on such evaluations in makingits decision; that some
of the partners’ comments were the product of stereotyping;
and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those particular comments, either in Hopkins’ case or in the past.
Certainly a plausible—and, one might say, inevitable—conclusion to draw from this set of circumstances is that the
Policy Board in making its decision did in fact take into account all of the partners’ comments, including the comments
that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women’s
proper deportment.
Price Waterhouse concedes that the proof in Transportation Management, supra, adequately showed that the employer there hadrelied on an impermissible motivation in firing the plaintiff. Brief for Petitioner 45. But the only
evidence in that case that a discriminatory motive contributed to the plaintiff’s discharge was that the employer harbored a grudge toward theplaintiff on account of his union
activity; there was, contrary to Price Waterhouse’s suggestion, no direct evidence that that grudge had played a role in
Board had identified with her candidacy.” 618 F. Supp., at 1117. This
conclusion was reasonable in light of the testimonyat trial of a member of
both the Policy Board and the Admissions Committee, who stated that he
had “no doubt” that Beyer would discuss with Hopkinsthe reasonsfor placing her candidacy on hold and that Beyer “knew exactly where the problems were” regarding Hopkins. Tr. 316.
* Wedo not understand the dissenters’ dissatisfaction with the District
Judge’s statements regardingthe failure of Price Waterhouseto “sensitize”
partners to the dangers of sexism. Post, at 15-16. Madein the context
of determining that Price Waterhouse had not disclaimed reliance on sexbased evaluations, and following the judge’s description of the firm’s history of condoning such evaluations, the judge’s remarks seem to us
justified.
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the decision, andin fact, the employer had
given other reasonsin explainingthe plaintiff’s discharge.
See 462 U. S. , at
396. If the partnership considers that proo
f sufficient, we do
not know why it takes such vehement issu
e with Hopkins’

proof.

Noris the finding that sex stereotyping play
ed a part in
the Policy Board’s decision undermined by
the fact that many
of the suspect comments were made by
supporters rather
than detractors of Hopkins. A negative
comment, even
when made in the context of a generally
favorable review,
nevertheless may influence the decisionmake
r to think less
highly of the candidate; the Policy Board,
in fact, did not simply tally the “yes’s” and “no’s” regardin
g a candidate, but
carefully reviewed the content of the subm
itted comments.
The additional suggestion that the comm
ents were made by
“per
sons outside the decisionmaking chai
n” (Brief for Peti-

tioner 48)—and therefore could not have
harmed Hopkins —
simply ignores the critical role that part
ners’ comments
played in the Policy Board’s partnership
decisions.
Price Waterhouse appears to think that
we cannot affirm
the factual findings of the trial court with
out deciding that,
instead of being overbearing and aggressi
ve and curt, Hopkins is in fact kind and considerate and
patient. If this is
indeed its impression, petitioner misunder
stands the theory —
on which Hopkins prevailed. The District
Judge acknowledged that Hopkins’ conduct justified comp
laints about her
behavior as a senior manager. But he also
concluded that
the reactionsof at least some of the partners
were reactions
to her as a woman manager. Where an
evaluation is based
on a subjective assessmentof a person’s stre
ngths and weaknesses, it is simply not true that each eval
uator will focus on,
or
even mention, the same weaknesses.

Thus, even if

we
knew that Hopkins had “personality prob
lems,” this would
not tell us that the partners who cast
their evaluations of
Hopkins in sex-based terms would have
criticized her as
sharply(orcriticized her at all) if she had
been a man. It is

28

PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS

not our job to review the evidence and decide that the negative reactions to Hopkins were based on reality; our perception of Hopkins’ characteris irrelevant. Wesit not to deter‘mine whether Ms. Hopkinsis nice, but to decide whether the
partners reacted negatively to her personality because sheis

—

a woman.

Vv

We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves
that her gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, the defendant may avoid a finding ofliability only
by proving by a preponderanceof the evidence that it would
have made the samedecision even if it had not taken the
plaintiff’s gender into account. Because the courts below
erred by deciding that the defendant must makethis proof by
clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability and
remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 87-1167

PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER »v.
ANN B. HOPKINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May1, 1989]

JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, to determine the proper approach to causation
in this case, we need look only to the Court’s opinion in Mt.
Healthy City School District Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S.
274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a public employee was not rehired, in part because of his exercise of First Amendment
rights and in part because of permissible considerations.
The Court rejected a rule of causation that focused “solely on
whetherprotected conduct played a part, ‘substantial’ or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire,” on the grounds that such

a rule could make the employee better off by exercising his
constitutional rights than by doing nothing at all. Jd., at
285. Instead, the Court outlined the following approach:
“Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed
upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a ‘substan-

tial factor’—or, to put it in other words, that it was a

‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision not to rehire

him.

Respondent having carried that burden, however,

the District Court should have gone on to determine
whether the Board had shownbya preponderanceof the
evidence that it would have reached the samedecision as
to respondent’s reemploymenteven in the absence of the
protected conduct.” Jd., at 287 (footnote omitted).

240-806 0 - 89 - 3
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It is not necessary to get into semantic discussions on

whether the Mt. Healthy approach is “but for” causation in

another guise or creates an affirmative defense on the part of
the employer to see its clear application to the issues before
us in this case. Asin Mt. Healthy, the District Court found
that the employer was motivated by both legitimate andillegitimate factors.

And here, as in Mt. Healthy, and as and

the Court now holds, Hopkins was not required to prove that
the illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason
? for the petitioner’s action. Rather, as JUSTICE O’CONNOR

states, her burden was to show that the unlawful motive was

a substantialfaetor in the adverse employment action. The
District Court, as its opinion was construed by the Court of

Appeals, so found, 263 U. 8. App. D. C. 321, 338, 334, 825 F.

2d 458, 470, 471 (1987), and I agree that the finding was
supported by the record. The burden of persuasion then
should have shifted to Price Waterhouse to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision ... in the absence of” the unlawful motive.
Mt. Healthy, supra, at 287.
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that applying this approach to causation in Title VII cases is not a departure from
and does not require modification of the Court’s holdings in
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248
(1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). The Court has made clear that “mixed motive”
cases, such as the present one, are different from pretext
cases such as McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. In pretext
cases, “the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives,
but not both, were the ‘true’ motives behind the decision.”

NLRBv. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393,

400, n. 5 (1988). In mixed motive cases, however, there is
no one “true” motive behind the decision. Instead, the deci-

sion is a result of multiple factors, at least one of whichis legitimate. It can hardly be said that our decision in this case
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is a departure from cases that are “inapposite.” Ibid. I also
disagree with the dissent’s assertion that this approach to
causation is inconsistent with our statement in Burdine that
“[t]he ultimate burden of persuading thetrier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remainsat all times with the plaintiff.” 450 U.S., at 253. As
we indicated in Transportation Management Corp., the
showing required by Mt. Healthy does not improperly shift
from the plaintiff the ultimate burden of persuasion on
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against
him or her. See 462 U. S., at 400, n. 5.
Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
reached the same employment decision in the absence of the
improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a
preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy, I concur in
the judgment reversing this case in part and remanding.
With respect to the employer’s burden, however, the plurality seems to require, at least in most cases, that the employer
submit objective evidence that the same result would have
occurred absent the unlawful motivation. Ante, at 21. In
my view, however, there is no special requirement that the

employer carry its burden by objective evidence. In a
mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive found would
have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the em-

ployer credibly testifies that the action would have been
taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample
proof. This would even more plainly be the case where the
employerdenies any illegitimate motive in the first place but

the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors
motivated the adverse action.*

*I agree with the plurality that if the employer carries this burden,

there has been no violation of Title VII.

SUPREME COURTOF THE UNITED
STATES
No. 87-1167
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PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONE
R »v.
ANN B. HOPKINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALSFOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 1, 1989]

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the
judgment.
I agree with the plurality that on thefa
cts presentedin this
case, the burden of persuasion should
shift to the employer
to demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision
concerning Ann Hopkins’ candidacy absent consideration
of her gender. I further agree that this burden shift is prop
erly part of the liability phase of the litigation. I thus conc
ur in the judgment
of the Court. My disagreement stem
s from the plurality’s
conclusions concerning the substantive
requirementof causation under the statute and its broad
statements regarding
the applicability of the allocation of the
burden of proof applied in this case. The evidentiary
rule the Court adopts
today should be viewed as a supplementt
o the careful framework established by our unanimous deci
sions in McDonnell
Dougla

=e

s Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (197
3), and

Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burd
ine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), for use in cases such as this one
where the employer
has created uncertainty as to causation
by knowingly giving
substantial weight to an impermissibl
e criterion. I write
separately to explain why I believe such
a departure from
the McDonnell Douglas standard is just
ified in the circumstances presented by this andlike case
s, and to express my
views as to when and how the strong
medicine of requiring
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the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
causation should be administered.
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Title VII provides in pertinent part: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-

ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (emphasis
added). Thelegislative history of Title VII bears out what
its plain language suggests: a substantive violation of the
statute only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate criterion is the “but-for” cause of an adverse employment action. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress
was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the employment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts. Critics
of the bill that became Title VII labeled it a “thought control
bill,” and arguedthat it created a “punishable crime that does
ire an illegal external act as a basis for judgment.”

ng. Rec. 7254 (1964).

Senator Case, whose viewsthe

5 more than a mental act.

Only if he does the act because

y finds so persuasive elsewhere, responded:
~ “The man must doorfail to do something in regard to
~. employment. There must be somespecific external act,
of the groundsstated in the bill would there be anylegal
consequences.” Ibid.
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Thus, I disagree with the plurality’s dictum that the words
“because of” do not mean “but-for” causation; manifestly they

do. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 499
(1986) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (“(T]he general policy under

Title VII is to limit relief for racial discrimination in employ-

ment practices to actual victims of the discrimination”). We
should not, and need not, deviate from that policy today.
The question for decision in this case is whatallocation of the

—
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burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms
with the intent of Congress and the purposes behind Title
VII.
The evidence of congressional intent as to which party
should bear the burden of proof on the issue of causation is
considerably less clear. No doubt, as a general matter, Congress assumed that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would
bear the burden of proof on the elements critical to his or
her case. As the dissent points out, post, at 8, n. 3, the
interpretative memorandum submitted by sponsors of Title
VII indicates that “the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would

have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (emphasis added).
But in the area of tort liability, from whence the dissent’s
“but-for” standard of causation is derived, see post, at 4, the
law has long recognized that in certain “civil cases” leaving
the burden of persuasion on theplaintiff to prove “but-for”
causation would be both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care.
Thus, in multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty has
been established, the common law of torts has long shifted
the burdenof proof to multiple defendants to prove that their

negligent actions were not the “but-for” cause ofthe plaintiffs

injury. Seee. g., Summersv. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84-87, 199
P. 2d 1, 3-4 (1948). The same rule has been applied where

the effect of a defendant’s tortious conduct combines with a
force of unknown or innocent origin to produce the harm to
the plaintiff. See Kingston v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 191
Wis. 610, 616, 211 N. W. 918, 915 (1927) (“Granting that the
union of that fire [caused by defendant’s negligence] with another of natural origin, or with another of much greater proportions, is available as a defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that ... the fire set by him was not the
proximate cause of the damage”). See also 2 J. Wigmore,

Select Cases on the Law of Torts, § 158, p. 865 (1912) (“When

two or more personsbytheir acts are possibly the sole cause

4
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of a harm, or when two or moreacts of the same person are
possibly the sole cause, and the plaintiff has introduced evidence that one of the two persons, or one of the same person’s two acts, is culpable, then the defendant has the burden

of proving that the other person, or his other act, was the
sole cause of the harm”).
While requiring that the plaintiff in a tort suit or a Title
VII action prove that the defendant’s “breach of duty” was
the “but-for” cause of an injury does not generally hamper
effective enforcement of the policies behind those causes of
action,
“st other times the [but-for] test demands the impossible. It challenges the imaginationof the trier to probe
into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs.
Heis invited to make an estimate concerning facts that
concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to
what might have happened opens the door wide for conjecture. But when conjecture is demanded it can be
given a direction that is consistent with the policy
considerations that underlie the controversy.” Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 67
(1956).
Like the common law oftorts, the statutory employment

“tort” created by Title VII has two basic purposes. The first
is to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary
to public policy and harmful to society as a whole. As we
have noted in the past, the award of backpay toa Title VII
plaintiff provides “the spuror catalyst which causes employers and unionsto self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination in employment.
Albemare Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975)
(citation omitted). The second goal of Title VII is “to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employmentdiscrimination.” Id., at 418.
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Both these goals are reflected in the elements of a disparate treatment action. There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on genderor race in making employment decisions an evil in itself. As Senator Clark put it, “(t]he bill
simply eliminates consideration of color [or other forbidden
criteria] from the decision to hire or promote.” 110 Cong.

Rec. 7218 (1964).

See also id., at 13088 (1964) (remarks of

Sen. Humphrey) (“What the bill does. . . is simply to makeit
an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment”). Reliance on such factorsis exactly what the threat
of Title VII liability was meant to deter. While the main
concern of the statute was with employment opportunity,
Congress wascertainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which
comesfrom being evaluated by a process which treats one as
an inferior by reason ofone’s race or sex. This Court’s decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long recognized that whateverthe final outcomeofa decisional process,
the inclusion ofrace or sex as a consideration within it harms
both society and the individual. See Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S. —— (1989).

At the same time, Con-

gress clearly conditioned legal liability on a determination
that the considerationof anillegitimate factor caused a tangible employment injury of some kind.
Where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the deterrent purpose of the statute has

clearly been triggered. More importantly, as an evidentiary
matter, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that absent
further explanation, the employer’s discriminatory motiva-

tion “caused” the employment decision. The employer has
not yet been shownto be a violator, but neitheris it entitled
to the same presumptionof good faith concerning its employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Both the policies behind the statute, and the evidentiary principles developed in
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the analogous area of causation in the law of torts, suggest
that at this point the employer may be required to convince
the factfinder that, despite the smoke, thereis nofire.

Wehave given recognition to these principles in our cases
which have discussed the “remedial phase”of class action disparate treatment cases. Oncetheclass has established that
discrimination against a protected group wasessentially the
employer’s “standard practice,” there has been harm to the
group and injunctive relief is appropriate. But as to the individual membersoftheclass, the liability phase ofthelitigation is not complete. See Dillon v. Coles, 746 F. 2d 998,
1004 (CA8 1984) (“It is misleading to speak of the additional
proof required by an individual class memberfor relief as
being a part of the damage phase, that evidence is actually
an element of the liability portion of the case”) (footnote omitted). Because the class has already demonstratedthat, as a
rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer’s
decisions, the burden shifts to the employer “to demonstrate
that the individual applicant was denied an employment
opportunity for legitimate reasons.” Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 362 (1977). See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).

The individual membersof a class action treatment case
stand in much the same position as Ann Hopkins here.
There has been a strong showing that the employer has done
exactly what Title VII forbids, but the connection between
the employer’sillegitimate motivation and any injury to the
individual plaintiff is unclear. At this point calling upon the
employer to show that despite consideration of illegitimate
factors the individual plaintiff would not have been hired or
promoted in any event hardly seems “unfair” or contrary to
the substantive commandof the statute.

In fact, an individ-

ual plaintiff who has shown that anillegitimate factor played
a substantial role in the decision in her case has proved more
than the class memberin a Teamsters type action. Thelatter receives the benefit of a burden shift to the defendant
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based on the likelihoo
d that an illegitimate
criterion was a
factor in the individua
l employment decision
.
There is a tension
between the Franks
and Teamsters
line of dec

isions and the individua
l treatment cases cit
by the dissent. See pos
ed
t, at 8-10. Logically,
under the dissent’s view, each memb
er of a disparate treatm
ent class action would have to show
“but-for” causation as to
his or her
individual employment
decision, sinceit is no
t
an
element
of the pattern or practi
ce proof of the entire
class and it is
statutorily mandated tha
t the plaintiff bear th
e burden of
proof on this issue th
roughout the litigation.
While the

alien to our Title VII jur
isprudence,
Moreover, placing the bu
rden on the defendant in
this case
to prove that the same
decision would have be
en
jus
tif
ied by
legitimate reasonsis consis
tent with our interpretati
on of the
constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. Like
a disparate treatment plaintiff,
one who asserts that go
ve
rn
mental
action violates the Equa
l Protection Clause must
sh
ow that
he or she is, “the vic
tim of intentional dis
crimination.”
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 256
. Comparepost, at 8,
11 (KEenNEDY,J., dissenting)
with

Washington v. Davis,
426 U. 8.
In Alexanderv. Lousia
na
,
40
5
U.S. 625
(1972), we dealt with a
criminal def
229, 240 (1976).

endant’s allegation that
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Id., at 630.

Once the consideration of race in the decisional

process had been established, we held that “the burden of
proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral
selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.”

Jd., at 632.

Weadhered to similar principles in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. 8. 252 (1977), a case
which, like this one, presented the problems of motivation
and causation in the context of a multimember decisionmaking body authorized to consider a wide range of factors in
arriving at its decisions. In Arlington Heights a group of
minority plaintiffs claimed that a municipal governing body’s
refusal to rezone a plot of land to allow for the construction
of low-income integrated housing was racially motivated.
On the issue of causation, we indicated that the plaintiff was
not required
“to prove that the challenged action rested solely on
racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said
that a legislature or administrative body operating under
a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a
single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the
‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one. In fact, it is becauselegislators and administrators are properly concerned with
balancing numerous competing considerations that
courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their deci-

sions, absent a showing of arbitrariness of irrationality.
But racial discrimination is not just another competing
consideration. Whenthereis a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.” Id.,
at 265-266 (citation omitted).

If the strong presumption of regularity and rationality of
legislative decisionmaking must give wayin the face of evidence that race has played a significant part in a legislative decision, I simply cannot believe that Congress intended
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Title VII to accord more deference to a private employer

in the face of evidence that its decisional process has been
substantially infected by discrimination. Indeed, where a

public employee brings a “disparate treatment”claim under
42 U.S. C. §1983 and the Equal Protection Clause the employee is entitled to the favorable evidentiary framework of
Arlington Heights. See, e. g., Hervey v. City of Little Rock,
787 F. 2d 1223, 1233-1234 (CA8 1986) (applying Arlington

Heights to public employee’s claim of sex discrimination in
promotion decision); Lee v. Russell County Board of Education, 684 F. 2d 769, 773-774 (CA11 1982) (applying Arlington
Heights to public employees’ claimsof race discrimination in
discharge case). Under the dissent’s reading of Title VII,
Congress’ extension of the coverage of the statute to public
employers in 1972 has placed these employees under a less
favorable evidentiary regime. In my view, nothing in the
language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption
of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion
on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns
would have justified an adverse employment action where
the plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substantial role in the employment decision.
Even the dissenting judge below “[had] no quarrel with [the]
principle” that “a party with one permissible motive and one
unlawful one may prevail only by affirmatively proving that
it would have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive
were absent.” 263 U.S. App. D. C. 321, 341, 825 F. 2d 458,
478 (1987) (Williams, J. dissenting).
II
The dissent’s summary of our individual disparate treatment cases to date is fair and accurate, and amply demonstrates that the rule we adopt today is a at least a change
in direction from some of our prior precedents. See post,
at 8-10. We have indeed emphasized in the past that in an
individual disparate treatment action the plaintiff bears the
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burden of persuasion throughout the litigation. Nor have
we confined the word “pretext” to the narrow definition
which the plurality attempts to pin on it today. See ante,
at 15-17. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine clearly contemplated that a disparate treatment plaintiff could show that
the employer’s proffered explanation for an event was not
“the true reason”either becauseit it never motivated the employer in its employmentdecisions or because it did not do so
in a particular case. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine assumedthat the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion
as to both these attacks, and weclearly depart from that
framework today. Such a departure requires justification,
and its outlines should be carefully drawn.
First, McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with a situation
wherethe plaintiff presented no direct evidence that the employer had relied on a forbidden factor under Title VII in
making an employment decision. The prima facie case es-

tablished there was notdifficult to prove, and was based only

on the statistical probability that when a numberofpotential
causes for an employmentdecision are eliminated an inference arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the motiva-

tion behind the decision.

See Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 358,

n. 44 (“{T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require
direct proof of discrimination”). In the face of this inferential proof, the employer’s burden was deemedto be only one
of production; the employer must articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978). The
plaintiff must then be given an “opportunity to demonstrate

by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons
for his rejection were in fact a coverupfor a racially discriminatory decision.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 805.
Our decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), also involved the “narrow

question” whether, aftera plaintiff had carried the “not onerous” burden of establishing the prima facie case under Mc-
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Donnell Douglas, the burden of persuasion should be shifted
to the employer to prove that a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action existed. 450 U.S., at 250. As
the discussion of Teamsters and Arlington Heights indicates,
I do not think that the employeris entitled to the same presumption of good faith wherethereis direct evidence thatit
has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration
is forbidden by Title VII.
The only individual treatment case cited by the dissent
which involved the kind of direct evidence of discriminatory
animus with which weare confronted here is United States
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
713-714, n. 2 (1983).

The question presented to the Court

in that case involved only a challenge to the elements of the
primafacie case under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, see
Pet. for Cert. in United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, O. T. 1981, No. 1044, and the question we

confront today was neither briefed nor argued to the Court.
Asshould be apparent, the entire purpose of the McDonnell [
Douglas primafacie case is to compensate for the fact that
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by. That the employer’s burden in rebutting such an inferential case of discrimination is only one of production does not
mean that the scales should be weighted in the same manner
where there 7s direct evidence of intentional discrimination.
Indeed, in one Age Discrimination in Employment Actcase,
the Court seemed to indicate that “the McDonnell Douglas
test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). See also Kast Texas

Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
403-404, n. 9 (1977).

Second, the facts of this case, andnumberlike_

it decided b

Is, convince methatthe evi-

dentiary standard I propose is necessary to makereal the

promise of McDonnell Douglas that “[i]Jn the implementation
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VII tolerates no..._discrimination,subtle or otherwise.”
411 U. S., at 801. In this case, the District Court found that
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a number of the evaluations of Ann Hopkins submitted by
partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform
to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against

LA

618 F. Supp. 1109,
her election to the partnership.
1116-1117 (1985). The District Court further found that

oct

these evaluations were given “great weight” by the

mm

decisionmakers at Price Waterhouse.

In addi-

an

wards women to play a significant, though unquantifiable,
role in its decision not to invite her to become a partner.”

|

1

J

PBT RAT TS

Jd., at 1118.

tion, the District Court found that the partner responsible for
informing Hopkinsof the factors which caused her candidacy
to be placed on hold, indicated that her “professional” problems would be solved if she would “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hairstyled,
and wear jewelry.” Id., at 1117 (footnote omitted). As the
Court of Appeals characterized it, Ann Hopkins proved that
Price Waterhouse “permitt[ed] stereotypical attitudes to-

J

|

|
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263 U. S. App. D. C., at 324, 825 F. 2d, at 461.
At this point Ann Hopkins had takenproof
it could go. She had proved discriminatory input into the
decisional process, and had proved that participants in the
process considered her failure to conform to the stereotypes
credited by a numberof the decisionmakers had been a substantial factor in the decision. It is as if Ann Hopkins were
sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership decisions were being made. Asthe partnersfiled in to consider
her candidacy, she heard several of them them makesexist
remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership. Asthe
decisionmakers exited the room, she wastold by one of those
privy to the decisionmaking process that her gender was a
major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid. If, as
we noted in Teamsters, “[plresumptions shifting the burden
of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of

PRICE WATERHOUSEv. HOPKINS
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probabilities and to conform with a party’s superior access to
the proof,” 431 U.S., at 359, n. 45, one would be hard

pressed to think of a situation where it would be more appropriate to require the defendant to show that its decision
would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns.
Moreover, there is mounting evidence in the decisions of

the lower courts that respondent hereis not alone i

i

ability to pinpoint discrimination as the precise ¢
injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role

indecisional process. Many of these courts, which deal
with the evidentiary issues in Title VII cases on a regular
basis, have concluded that placing the risk of nonpersuasion
on the defendantin a situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by its consideration of an illegitimate
criterion makes sense as a rule of evidence and furthers the
substantive commandof Title VII. See, e. g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F. 2d 1552, 1556 (CA11 1983)

(Tjoflat, J.) (“It would beillogical, indeed ironic, to hold a
Title VII plaintiff presenting direct evidence of a defendant’s
intent to discriminate to a more stringent burden of proof, or
to allow a defendant to meet that direct proof by merely
articulating, but not proving, legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its action”).

Particularlycontext

professional world, where decisi
‘gial bodies on the basis of largely subjecti

m
iteri

=
ir-

inte ait r

action
it vedecisionmakers’
to declaring Title VII inapplicabl

isions.

See,

e.g., Fields v. Clark University, 817 F. 2d 931, 935-937

(CA1 1987) (where plaintiff produced “strong evidence” that
sexist attitudes infected faculty tenure decision burden properly shifted to defendant to show that it would have reached

the same decision absent discrimination); Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F. 2d 558, 563 (CA11 1985) (direct evi-

dence of discriminatory animus in decision to discharge college professor shifted burden of persuasion to defendant).
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burden to
Finally, I am convinced that a rule shifting the
that an illegitithe defendant where theplaintiff has shown
employment
the
in
mate criterion was a “substantial factor”
l policies emdecision will not conflict with other congressiona
ides that an
bodied in Title VII. Title VI expressly prov
employees
to
t
tmen
trea
employer need not give preferential
nal orinatio
or
or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex,
genthe
with
gin in order to maintain a work force in balance
). The intereral population. See 42 U. S.C. §2000e-2(j
force is noted by
pretive memorandum, whose authoritative
fically provides:
the plurality, see ante, at 13, n. 8, speci
employer main“There is no requirementin title VII that an
contrary, any
tain a racial balance in his work force. On the
whatever
ce,
balan
l
deliberate attempt to maintain a racia
title VII
of
tion
such a balance may be, would involve a viola
d require an embecause maintaining such a balance woul
of race.” 110
ployer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis
Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).

Bank & Trust, 487
Last Term, in Watson v. Fort Worth

luded that the
U. S. —— (1988), the Court unanimously conc
gs v. Duke
Grig
in
ed
disparate impact analysis first enunciat
to subnded
exte
Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (197), should be
At the same
jective or discretionary selection processes.
the focus
that
ern
conc
ated
time a plurality of the Court indic
force
could
ng
setti
on bare statistics in the disparate impact

hylactic measures” in
employers to adopt “inappropriate prop

on to emphasize
violation of §2000e-2(j). The plurality went
may not simply
tiff
that in a disparate impact case, the plain
’s work force.
point to a statistical disparity in the employer
cular employment
Instead, the plaintiff must identify a parti
of a kind and
practice and “must offer statistical evidence
question has
in
degree sufficient to show that the practice
or promotions becaused the exclusion of applicants for jobs
group.” 487 U.. Bay
cause of their membership in a protected
ultimate burden of
at ——. Theplurality indicated that “the
ected group has
proving that discrimination against a prot
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4

been caused by a specific employment practice remains with
the plaintiff at all times.” Jd., at ——.
I believe there are significant differences between shifting
the burden of persuasion to the employer in a case resting

purely on statistical proof as in the disparate impact setting
and shifting the burden of persuasion in a caselike this one,

.
evid nc
direct
employ
y
where an b

4

an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in a particular employmentdecision. First, the explicit consideration of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employment decisions “was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII.” Teamsters, 481 U.S., at
335, n. 15. While the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in
an impact case maybothbe indicators of discriminationorits
“functional equivalent,” they are not, in and of themselves,

the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment
setting. Second, shifting the burden of persuasion to the
employer in a situation like this one creates no incentive

to preferential treatment in violation of §2000e-(2)(j). To
avoid bearing the burden of justifying its decision, the employer need not seek racial or sexual balance in its work
force; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance on

forbidden criteria in making its employmentdecisions.

While the danger of forcing employers to engage in un-

warranted preferential treatment is thus less dramatic in
this setting than in the situation the Court faced in Watson,
it is far from wholly illusory.

|
r

Based on its misreading of

the words “because of” in the statute, see ante, at 9-12, the
plurality appears to conclude that if a decisional process is
“tainted” by awareness of sex or race in any way, the employer has violated the statute, and Title VII thus commands
that the burden shift to the employerto justify its decision.
Ante, at 21-22. Theplurality thus effectively reads the causation requirement out of the statute, and then replaces it
with an “affirmative defense.” Ante, at 15-17.

H
4
H
i
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In myview, in order to justify shifting the burden on the
issue of causation to the defendant, a treatment—

illegitimateplaintif direct
decision. As the
eriterion was a substantial factor in the
Court of Appeals noted below,“[w]hile most circuits have not
confronted the question squarely, the consensus among those
that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated
by direct evidence that discriminatory animus played a significant or substantial role in the employment decision, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the decision would
have been the same absent discrimination.” 263 U. S. App.
D. C., at 233-244, 825 F. 2d, at 470-471. Requiring that the
plaintiff demonstrate that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the employment decision identifies those employmentsituations where the deterrent purpose of Title VII
is most clearly implicated. As an evidentiary matter, where
a plaintiff has madethis type of showing
vation, the factfinderis entitled to presume that the employer’s discriminatory animus madea difference to the outcome,
absent proof to the contrary from the employer. Where a
disparate treatment plaintiff has made such a showing, the
burden then rests with the employer to convince the trier of
fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would
have been the same absent consideration of the illegitimate
factor. The employer need not isolate the sole cause for the
decision, rather it must demonstrate that with the illegiti-

mate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business

SSS pe aan

reasons would have induced it to take the same employment
action. This evidentiary scheme essentially requires the employer to place the employee in the same position he or she
would have occupied absent discrimination. Cf. Mt. Healthy
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. 8. 274, 286 (1977). If
the employer fails to carry this burden, the factfinderis justified in concluding that the decision was made “because of”
consideration of the illegitimate factor and the substantive
standard forliability underthe statute is satisfied.

17

Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, see Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U. 8S. 57, 63-69 (1986), cannot justify requiring
the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions
were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself suffice to satisfy the
plaintiff’s burden in this regard. In addition, in my view testimony such as Dr. Fiske’s in this case, standing alone, would
not justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer.
Race and gender always “play a role” in an employmentdecision in the benign sense that these are humancharacteristics
of which decisionmakers are aware and may commenton in a
perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion. For example, in the context of this case, a mere reference to “a lady
candidate” might show that gender “played a role” in the decision, but by no means could support a rational eeS
inference that the decision was made “because of »
Whatis required is what Ann Hopkins sho
1
evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative
liance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.
It should be obvious that the threshold standard I would
adopt for shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant
differs substantially from that proposed by the plurality, the
plurality’s suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding. See
ante, at 20, n. 18. The plurality proceeds from the premise
that the words “because of” in the statute do not embody any
causal requirement at all. Under my approach, the plaintiff
must produce evidence sufficient to show that anillegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an
inference that the decision was made “because of”the plain-

tiff’s protected status. Only then would the burden of proof
shift to the defendant to prove that the decision would have
been justified by other, wholly legitimate considerations.
See also ante, at 2 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).

we
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In sum, because of the concerns outlined above, and because I believe that the deterrent purpose of Title VII is
disserved by a rule which places the burden of proof on plaintiffs on the issue of causation in all circumstances, I would

retain but supplement the framework we established in McDonnell Douglas and subsequent cases. The structure of
the presentation of evidence in an individual treatment case
should conform to the generaloutlines we established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. First, the plaintiff must establish the McDonell Douglas prima facie case by showing
membership in a protected group, qualification for the job,
rejection for the position, and that after rejection the employer continued to seek applicants of complainant’s general
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802. The
plaintiff should also present any direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisional process. The defendant
should then present its case, including its evidence as to le' gitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision.

As the dissent notes, under this framework, the em-

ployer “has every incentive to convince the trier of fact that
the decision was lawful.” Post, at 14, citing Burdine, 450
U. S., at 258. Once all the evidence has been received, the
court should determine whether the McDonnell Douglas or
Price Waterhouse framework properly applies to the evidence before it. If the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Price
Waterhouse threshold, the case should be decided under the
principles enunciated in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,
with theplaintiff bearing the burden of persuasion on theultimate issue whether the employment action was taken because of discrimination. In my view, such a system is both
fair and workable and it calibrates the evidentiary requirements demandedof the parties to the goals behindthestatuteitself.

I agree with the dissent, see post, at 14-15, n. 4, that the
evidentiary framework I propose should be available to all
disparate treatment plaintiffs where an illegitimate consid-
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eration played a substantial role in an adverse employment
decision. The Court’s allocation of the burden of proof in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U. S. 616, 626-627
(1987), rested squarely on “the analytical frameworkset forth

in McDonnell Douglas,” id., at 626, which wealter today.

It would be odd to say the least if the evidentiary rules applicable to Title VII actions were themselves dependent on
the genderor the skin color ofthe litigants. But see, ante,
——A

at 8, n. 38.

In this case, I agree with the plurality that petitioner
should be called upon to show that the outcome would have
been the sameif respondent’s professional merit had beenits
only concern. On remand, the District Court should determine whether Price Waterhouse has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that if gender had not been part of the
process, its employment decision concerning Ann Hopkins
would nonetheless have been the same.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 87-1167

PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER ».
ANN B. HOPKINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 1, 1989]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and

JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.

Today the Court manipulates existing and complex rules
for employment discrimination cases in a way certain to result in confusion. Continued adherence to the evidentiary
schemeestablished in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine is a
wiser course than creation of more disarray in an area of the
law already difficult for the bench and bar, and so I must
dissent.
Before turning to my reasons for disagreement with the
Court’s disposition of the case, it is important to review the
actual holding of today’s decision. I read the opinions as
establishing that in a limited numberofcases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to
the defendant to show that an adverse employmentdecision
would have been supported by legitimate reasons. The shift
in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff
proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive wasa substantial factor actually relied upon in making the decision.

Ante, at 16-17 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); ante, at 2 (opinion

of WHITE, J.).

As the opinions make plain, the evidentiary

scheme created todayis not for every case in which plaintiff
produces evidence of stray remarks in the workplace. Ante,

2
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at 21 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); ante, at 17 (opinion of O’ConNOR, J.).

Wheretheplaintiff makes the requisite showing, the burden that shifts to the employer is to show that legitimate
employment considerations would havejustified the decision
without reference to any impermissible motive. Ante, at 3
(opinion of WHITE, J.); ante, at 18 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).

The employer’s proof on the point is to be presented and reviewed just as with any other evidentiary question: the Court
does not accept the plurality’s suggestion that an employer’s
evidence need be “objective” or otherwise out of the ordinary. Ante, at 3 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
In sum, the Court alters the evidentiary framework of
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine for a closely defined set
Although JUSTICE O’CONNOR advances some
of cases.
thoughtful arguments for this change, I remain convinced
that it is unnecessary and unwise. Moretroublingis the plurality’s rationale for today’s decision, which includes a number of unfortunate pronouncements on both causation and
methods of proof in employment discrimination cases. To
demonstrate the defects in the plurality’s reasoning, it is necessary to discussfirst, the standardof causation in Title VII
cases, and second, the burden of proof.

I

Theplurality describesthis as a case about the standard of
causation underTitle VII, ante, at 7,but I respectfully suggest that the description is misleading. Muchofthe plurality’s rhetoric is spent denouncing a “but-for” standard of causation. The theoryof Title VII liability the plurality adopts,
however, essentially incorporates the but-for standard. The
importance of today’s decision is not the standard of causation it employs, but its shift to the defendant of the burden of
proof. The plurality’s causation analysis is misdirected, for
it is clear that, whoever bears the burden of proof on the
issue, Title VII liability requires a finding of but-for causa-
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See also ante, at 2 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); ante, at

3, n. (opinion of WHITE, J.).
The wordsof Title VII are not obscure.

The part of the

statute relevant to this case providesthat:
“Tt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).

42

By any normal understanding, the phrase “because of” conveys the idea that the motive in question made a difference
to the outcome. We use the words this way in everyday
speech.

And assuming, as the plurality does, that we ought

to consider the interpretive memorandum prepared by the

statute’s drafters, we find that this is what the words meant
to them as well. “To discriminate is to make a distinction, to

make a difference in treatment or favor.” 110 Cong. Rec.
7213 (1964). Congress could not have chosen a clearer way
to indicate that proof of liability under Title VII requires

a showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin

caused the decision at issue.
Ourdecisions confirm that Title VII is not concerned with
the mere presence of impermissible motives; it is directed to
employment decisions that result from those motives. The
verbal formulae we have used in our precedents are synonymous with but-for causation. Thus we havesaid that providing different insurance coverage to male and female employees violates the statute by treating the employee “‘in a
manner which but-for that person’s sex would be different.’”
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U. S. 669, 683 (1983), quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 485 U. S. 702, 711 (1978).

We have de-

scribed the relevant question as whether the employmentde-
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cision was “based on” a discriminatory criterion, Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977), or whether the

particular employment decision at issue was “made on the
basis of” an impermissible factor, Cooper v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 875 (1984).

What we term “but-for”cause is the least rigorous standard that is consistent with the approach to causation our
precedents describe. If a motive is not a but-for cause of
an event, then by definition it did not make a difference to
the outcome. The event would have occurred just the same
without it. Common law approaches to causation often require proof of but-for cause as a starting point toward proof
of legal cause. The law may require more than but-for

}i

cause, for instance proximate cause, before imposing lia-

|

bility. Any standard less than but-for, however, simply represents a decision to imposeliability without causation. As
Dean Prosser puts it, “[aJn act or omission is not regarded
as a cause of an event if the particular event would have
occurred without it.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, &
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed.

|
1
|
|
| ae

1984).
Oneof the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow
confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to
but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard onceit has
placed the burdenof proof as to causation upon the employer.
This approach conflates the question whether causation must
be shown with the question of howit is to be shown. Because the plurality’s theory of Title VII causation is ultimately consistent with a but-for standard, it might be said

that my disagreement with the plurality’s comments on but-

for cause is simply academic.

See ante, at 2 (opinion of

WHITE, J.). But since those comments seem to influence the
decision, I turn now to that part of the plurality’s analysis.
The plurality begins by noting the quite unremarkable fact

that Title VII is written in the present tense. Arte, at 10.
It is unlawful “to fail” or “to refuse” to provide employment
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benefits on the basis of sex, not “to have failed” or “to have

refused” to have done so. The plurality claims that the present tense excludes a but-for inquiry as the relevant standard
because but-for causation is necessarily concerned with a hypothetical inquiry into how a past event would have occurred
absent the contested motivation.

This observation, how-

ever, tells us nothing of particular relevance to Title VII or
the cause of action it creates. I am unaware of any federal
prohibitory statute that is written in the past tense. Every
liability determination, including the novel one constructed
by the plurality, necessarily is concerned with the examination of a past event.1. The plurality’s analysis of verb
tense serves only to divert attention from the causation requirement that is made part of the statute by the “because
of” phrase. That phrase, I respectfully submit, embodies a
rather simple concept that the plurality labors to ignore.’
Weare told next that but-for cause is not required, since
the words “because of” do not mean “solely because of.”
Ante, at 10.

No one contends, however, that sex must be

the sole cause of a decision before there is a Title VII violation. This is a separate question from whetherconsideration
of sex must be a cause of the decision. Under the accepted
‘The plurality’s description of its own standard is both hypothetical and
retrospective. The inquiry seeks to determine whether “if we asked the
employer at the moment of decision what its reasons were and if we re-

ceived a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant
or employee was a woman.”

Ante, at 20.

?The plurality’s discussion of overdetermined causes only highlights the
error ofits insistence that but-for is not the substantive standardof causation under Title VII. The opinion discussesthe situation where twophysical forces move an object, and either force acting alone would have moved
the object.

Ante, at11.

Translated to the context of Title VII, this situa-

tion would arise where an employertook an adverseaction in reliance both
on sex and on legitimate reasons, and either the illegitimate or the legitimate reason standing alone would have producedtheaction. If this state
of affairs is proved to the factfinder, there will be noliability under the
plurality’s own test, for the same decision would have been madehad the
illegitimate reason never been considered.

6
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approachto causation that I have discussed, sex is a cause for
the employment decision whenever, either by itself or in

combination with other factors, it made a difference to the

decision. Discrimination need not be the sole cause in order
for liability to arise, but merely a necessary element of the
set of factors that caused the decision, 7. e., a but-for cause.

See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Tranpeortation Co., 427
U. S. 273, 282, n. 10 (1976). The plurality seems to say that
since we know the words “because of” do not mean “solely because of,” they must not mean “because of”at all. This does
not follow, as a matter of either semantics or logic.
The plurality’s reliance on the “bona fide occupational
qualification” (BFOQ) provisions of Title VII, 42 U. S. C,
§ 2000e-2(e), is particularly inapt. The BFOQ provisions
allow an employer, in certain cases, to make an employment
decision of which it is conceded that sex is the cause. That
sex may be the legitimate cause of an employment decision
where genderis a BFOQis consistent with the opposite command that a decision caused by sex in any other casejustifies
the imposition of Title VII liability. This principle does not
support, however, the novel assertion that a violation has occurred where sex made no difference to the outcome.

The most confusing aspect of the plarality’s analysis of cau-

sation and liability is its internal inconsistency. Theplurality begins by saying: “When . . . an employer considers both
gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a deci-

sion, that decision was ‘because of’ sex and the other, legiti-

mate considerations —even if we maysay later, in the context
of litigation, that the decision would have been the sameif
gender had not been takeninto account.” Ante, at 10. Yet
it goes on to state that “an employer shall not be liable if it
can prove that, even if it had not taken genderinto account,
it would have cometo the samedecision.” Ante, at 12.

Given the languageof the statute, these statements cannot
both be true. Title VII unambiguously states that an employer who makesdecisions “because of” sex has violated the
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statute. The plurality’s first statement therefore appears to
indicate that an employer whoconsidersillegitimate reasons
when making a decision is a violator. But the opinion then
tells us that the employer who showsthat the same decision
would have been made absent consideration of sex is not a violator. If the second statement is to be reconciled with the
language of Title VII, it must be that a decision that would
have been the same absent consideration of sex was not made
“because of” sex.

In other words, thereis no violation of the

statute absent but-for causation. The plurality’s description
of the “same decision” test it adopts supports this view. The
opinion states that “{a] court that finds for a plaintiff under
this standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate
motive was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employment decision,”
ante, at 19, and that this “is not an imposition of liability
‘where sex made no difference to the outcome,’” ante, at 16,
nL.
The plurality attempts to reconcile its internal inconsis-

tency on the causation issue by describing the employer’s
showing as an “affirmative defense.” This is nothing more
than a label, and one not foundin the languageorlegislative
history of Title VII. Section 703(a)(1) is the statutory basis
of the cause of action, and the Court is obligated to explain
how its disparate treatment decisions are consistent with the
terms of §703(a)(1), not with general themesof legislative

history or with other parts of the statute that are plainly inapposite. While the test ultimately adopted bythe plurality
infra, at 14, the same cannotbesaid ofthe plurality’s reasoning with respect to causation. As JUSTICE O’CONNOR describes it, the plurality “reads the causation requirement out
of the statute, and then replaces it with an ‘affirmative defense.’” Ante, at 15. Labels aside, the import of today’s
decision is not that Title VII liability can arise without butfor causation, but that in certain cases it is not the plaintiff

eT

may not be inconsistent with the terms of §703(a)(1), see
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who must prove the presence of causation, but the defendant
who must proveits absence.
II
Weestablished the order of proof for individual Title VII
disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1978), and reaffirmed this allocation in
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. 8. 248
(1981). Under Burdine, once the plaintiff presents a prima
facie case, an inference of discrimination arises. The employer must rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The final burden
of persuasion, however, belongs to the plaintiff. Burdine
makesclear that the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id., at
258. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 489 U. S. 24, 29 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).’
I would adhere to this established evidentiary framework,
which provides the appropriate standard for this and other
individual disparate treatment cases. Today’s creation of a
new set of rules for “mixed-motive”cases is not mandated by
the statute itself. The Court’s attempt at refinement provides limited practical benefits at the cost of confusion and
complexity, with the attendent risk that the trier of fact will
misapprehend the controlling legal principles and reach an incorrect decision.

In view of the plurality’s treatment of Burdine and our
other disparate treatment cases, it is importantfirst to state
whythose cases are dispositive here. Theplurality tries to
’The interpretive memorandum on which the plurality relies makes
plain that “the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burdenof proving that discrimination had occurred.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964). Coupled with its earlier definition of discrimination, the memorandumtells us
that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an impermissible motive
“made a difference” in the treatment of the plaintiff. This is none other
than the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show but-for cause.
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reconcile its approach with Burdine by announcingthatit applies only to a “pretext” case, which it defines as a case in
which the plaintiff attempts to prove that the employer’s
proffered explanation is itself false.

Ante, at 15-17, and

Underthefirst of these two alternative methods, a

plaintiff meets her burdenif she can “persuade the court that
the employment decision more likely than not was motivated
by a discriminatory reason.” USPS Board of Governorsv.
Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 717-718 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). The plurality makes no attempt to addressthis aspect of our cases.
Our opinions make plain that Burdine applies to all individual disparate treatment cases, whethertheplaintiff offers
direct proof that discrimination motivated the employer’s
actions or chooses the indirect method of showing that the
employer’s proffered justification is false, that is to say, a
pretext. See Aikens, 460 U. S., at 714, n. 3 (“Asin any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence”). The plurality is mistaken in suggesting that
the plaintiff in a so-called “mixed motives” case will be disadvantaged by having to “squeeze her proof into Burdine’s
framework.” Ante, at 16. As we acknowledged in McDonnell Douglas, “(t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases,” and the specification of the prima facie case set forth
there “is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” 411 U. S., at 802,n. 18. The framework was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritual-

istic.” Aikens, 460 U.S., at 715. Burdine compels the
employer to come forward with its explanation of the decision
and permits the plaintiff to offer evidence undereither of the

Eee

added).

j

n. 11. This ignores the language of Burdine, which states
that a plaintiff may succeed in meeting her ultimate burden of
persuasion “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason morelikely motivated the employeror indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 450 U. S., at 256 (emphasis
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logical methodsfor proof of discrimination. This is hardly a
framework that confines the plaintiff; still less is it a justification for saying that the ultimate burden of proof must be on
the employer in a mixed motives case. Burdine provides an
orderly and adequate wayto place both inferential and direct
proof before the factfinder for a determination whetherintentional discrimination has caused the employment decision.
Regardless of the character of the evidence presented, we
have consistently held that the ultimate burden “remains at
all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 258.
Aikens illustrates the point. There, the evidence showed
that the plaintiff, a black man, was far more qualified than

any of the white applicants promoted ahead of him. More
important, the testimony showed that “the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue had made numerous
derogatory comments about blacks in general and Aikens in
particular.”

460 U.S., at 713-714, n. 2.

Yet the Court in

Aikens reiterated that the case was to be tried under the
proof scheme of Burdine. JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE
BLACKMUNconcurredto stress that the plaintiff could prevail
under the Burdine scheme in either of two ways, one of
which was directly to persuade the court that the employment decision was motivated by discrimination. 460 U.S.,
at 718. Aikens leaves no doubt that the so-called “pretext”
framework of Burdine has been considered to providea flexible means of addressing all individual disparate treatment
claims.
Downplaying the novelty of its opinion, the plurality claims
to have followed a “well-worn path” from our prior cases.
The path may be well-worn, but it is in the wrong forest.
The plurality again relies on Title VII’s BFOQ provisions,
under which an employer bears the burden of justifying the
use of a sex-based employmentqualification. See Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332-337 (1977).

In the BFOQ

context this is a sensible, indeed necessary, allocation of the
burden, for there by definition sex is the but-for cause of

PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS
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the employment decision and the only question remainingis
how the employercan justify it. The sameis true ofthe plurality’s citations to Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases,
ante, at 18. In such cases there is no question that pregnancy was the cause of the disputed action. The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and BFOQ casestell us nothing about the
case where the employerclaims not that a sex-based decision
was justified, but that the decision was not sex-based atall.
Closer analogies to the plurality’s new approach are found
in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977), and NRLB v. Transportation Management Corp.,

462 U. S. 393 (1983), but these cases were decidedin differ-

ent contexts. Mt. Healthy was a First Amendmentcase involving the firing of a teacher, and Transportation Management involved review of the NLRB’s interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act. The Transportation Management decision was based on the deference that the Court
traditionally accords NLRBinterpretations of the statutes it
administers. See 462 U.S., at 402-403. Neither case
therefore tells us why the established Burdine framework
should not continue to govern the order of proof underTitle
VII.
In contrast to the plurality, JUSTICE O’CONNOR acknowledges that the approach adopted today is a “departure from
the McDonnell Douglas standard.” Ante, at 1. Although
her reasons for supporting this departure are not without
force, they are not dispositive. As JUSTICE O’CONNOR
states, the most that can be said with respect to the Title VII
itself is that “nothing in the language, history, or purpose
of Title VII prohibits adoption” of the new approach. Ante,
at 9 (emphasis added). JUSTICE O’CONNORalso relies on
analogies from the commonlaw oftorts, other types of Title
VII litigation, and our equal protection cases. These analogies demonstrate that shifts in the burden of proof are not
unprecedented in the law of torts or employment discrimination. Nonetheless, I believe continued adherence to the
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Burdine framework is more consistent with the statutory
mandate. Congress’ manifest concern with preventing imposition of liability in cases where discriminatory animus did
not actually cause an adverseaction, see ante, at 2 (opinion

of O’CONNOR,J.), suggests to me that an affirmative showing
of causation should be required. And the most relevant portion of the legislative history supports just this view. See
n. 3, supra. The limited benefits that are likely to be produced by today’s innovation comeat the sacrifice of clarity
and practical application.
The potential benefits of the new approach, in my view, are
overstated.

First, the Court makes clear that the Price

Waterhouse scheme is applicable only in those cases where
the plaintiff has produced direct and substantial proof that an
impermissible motive was relied upon in making the decision
at issue. The burden shift properly will be found to apply in
only a limited number of employment discrimination cases.
The application of the new scheme, furthermore, will make a

difference only in a smaller subset of cases. The practical
importance of the burden of proof is the “risk of nonpersuasion,” and the new system will makea difference only where
the evidence is so evenly balanced that the factfinder cannot
say that either side’s explanation of the case is “morelikely”
true. This category will not include cases in which theallocation of the burdenof proof will be dispositive because of a
complete lack of evidence on the causation issue, ef. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948) (allocation
of burden dispositive because no evidence of which of two
negligently fired shots hit plaintiff). Rather, Price Waterhouse will apply only to cases in which there is substantial
evidence of reliance on an impermissible motive, as well
as evidence from the employer that legitimate reasons sup-

ported its action.

Although the Price Waterhouse system is not for every

case, almost every plaintiff is certain to ask for a Price
Waterhouse instruction, perhaps on the basis of “stray re-

PRICE WATERHOUSEv. HOPKINS

13

marks” or other evidence of discriminatory animus. Trial
and appellate courts will therefore be saddled with the task of
developing standards for determining when to apply the burden shift. One of their new tasks will be the generation of a
jurisprudence of the meaning of “substantial factor.” Courts
will also be required to makethe often subtle anddifficult distinction between “direct” and “indirect” or “circumstantial”
evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Addition of a second burden-shifting mechanism, the application of which itself depends on assessment of credibility and a determination
whetherevidenceis sufficiently direct and substantial, is not
likely to lend clarity to the process. The presenceof an existing burden-shifting mechanism distinguishes the individual
disparate treatment case from the tort, class action discrimination, and equal protection cases on which JUSTICE
O’CONNORrelies. The distinction makes JUSTICE WHITE’s
assertions that one “need look only to” Mt. Healthy and
Transportation Management to resolve this case, and that
our Title VII cases in this area are “inapposite,” ante, at 1-3,
at best hard to understand.
Confusion in the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in cases brought under §1981 or
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), where
courts borrow the Title VII order of proof for the conduct
of jury trials. See, e. g., Note, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for
Change, 73 Va. L. Rev. 601 (1987) (noting high reversal rate
caused by use of Title VII burdenshifting in a jury setting).
Perhaps such cases in the future will require a bifurcated
trial, with the jury retiring first to make the credibility findings necessary to determine whethertheplaintiff has proved
that an impermissible factor played a substantial part in the
decision, and later hearing evidence on the “same decision”or
“pretext” issues. Alternatively, perhaps the trial judge will
have the unenviable task of formulating a single instruction
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for the jury onall of the various burdens potentially involved

in the case.

I do not believe the minor refinement in Title VII procedures accomplished by today’s holding can justify the difficulties that will accompany it. Rather, I “remain confident that
the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S., at 258.

Although the employer does not

bear the burden of persuasion under Burdine, it must offer
clear and reasonably specific reasons for the contested decision, and has every incentive to persuadethe trier of fact that
the decision was lawful. Ibid. Further, the suggestion that
the employer should bear the burden of persuasion due to superior access to evidence haslittle force in the Title VII context, where the liberal discovery rules available to all litigants are supplemented by EEOCinvestigatoryfiles. Ibid.
In sum, the Burdine frameworkprovidesa “sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience
as it bears on the critical question of discrimination,” Aikens,

460 U. S., at 715, and it should continue to govern the order

of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases.‘

*The plurality states that it disregards the special context of affirmative

action.

Ante, at 8,n. 3.

It is not clear that this is possible.

Somecourts

have held that in a suit challenging an affirmative action plan, the question
of the plan’s validity need not be reached unless the plaintiff shows that the

plan was a but-for cause of the adverse decision. See McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Association Council, 830 F. 2d 659, 665 (CAT 1987),

cert. denied, 485 U. S. 914 (1988).

Presumably it will be easier for a plain-

tiff to show that consideration of race or sex pursuant to an affirmative
action plan was a substantial factor in a decision, and the court will need
to move on to the question of a plan’s validity. Moreover,if the structure
of the burdens of proof in Title VII suits is to be consistent, as might

be expected given the identical statutory language involved, today’s deci-

sion suggests that plaintiffs should no longer bear the burden of showing
that affirmative action plans areillegal. See Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U. S. 616, 626-627 (1987).
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III
The ultimate question in every individual disparate treatmentcase is whetherdiscrimination caused theparticular decision at issue. Someof the plurality’s comments with respect to the District Court’s findings in this case, however,
are potentially misleading. Asthe plurality notes, the District Court based its liability determination on expert evidence that some evaluations of respondent Hopkins were
based on unconscious sex stereotypes,® and on the fact that
Price Waterhouse failed to disclaim reliance on these comments when it conducted the partnership review. The District Court also based liability on Price Waterhouse’s failure
to “make partners sensitive to the dangers [of stereotyping],
to discourage comments tainted by sexism, or to investigate
comments to determine whether they wereinfluenced by stereotypes.” 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (DC 1985).
Although the District Court’s version of Title VII liability
is improper under any of today’s opinions, I thinkit important to stress that Title VII creates no independent cause of
action for sex stereotyping. Evidence of use by decisionmakersof sex stereotypesis, of course, quite relevant to the
question of discriminatory intent. The ultimate question,
*Theplaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should have
no trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any decision.
Price Waterhouse chose not to object to Fiske’s testimony, and at this
late stage we are constrained to accept it, but I think the plurality’s enthusiasm for Fiske’s conclusions unwarranted. Fiske purported to discern
stereotyping in comments that were gender neutral—e. g., “overbearing
and abrasive” —without any knowledge of the comments’ basis in reality
and without having met the speaker or subject. “To an expert of Dr.

Fiske’s qualifications, it seems plain that no woman could be overbearing,

arrogant, or abrasive: any observations to that effect would necessarily
be discounted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like this is
to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base any adverse action as

to a woman on such attributes.”

825 F. 2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J.,

dissenting). Today’s opinions cannot be read as requiring factfinders to
credit testimony based onthis type of analysis. See also ante, at 17 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).
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however, is whether discrimination caused the plaintiff’s
harm. Ourcases do not support the suggestion that failure
to “disclaim reliance” on stereotypical comments itself violates Title VII. Neither do they support creation of a “duty
to sensitize.” As the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals observed, acceptance of such theories would turn Title
VII “from a prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist thoughts.” 263 U.S. App. D. C.
321, 340, 825 F. 2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J., dissenting).

Employment discrimination claims require factfinders to
make difficult and sensitive decisions. Sometimes this may
mean that no finding of discrimination is justified even
though a qualified employee is passed over by a less than admirable employer. In other cases, Title VII’s protections
properly extend to plaintiffs who are by no means model employees.

As JUSTICE BRENNANnotes, ante, at 28, courts do

not sit to determine whetherlitigants are nice. In this case,
Hopkinsplainly presented a strong case both of her own pro-

fessional qualifications and of the presence of discrimination

in Price Waterhouse’s partnership process. Had the District
Court found on this record that sex discrimination caused the
adverse decision, I doubt it would have been reversible

error. Cf. Aikens, 460 U.S., at 714, n. 2. That decision
was for the finder of fact, however, and the District Court
made plain that sex discrimination was not a but-for cause of
the decision to place Hopkin’s partnership candidacy on hold.
Attempts to evade tough decisions by erecting novel theories
of liability or multitiered systems of shifting burdens are
misguided.
IV
The language of Title VII and our well-considered precedents require this plaintiff to establish that the decision
to place her candidacy on hold was made “because of” sex.
Here the District Court found that the “commentsoftheindividual partners and the expert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not
prove an intentional discriminatory motive or purpose,” 618
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F. Supp., at 1118, and that “[blecause plaintiff has considerable problems dealing with staff and peers, the Court
cannot say that she would have been elected to partnership
if the Policy Board’s decision had not been tainted by sexually based evaluations,” id., at 1120. Hopkins thus failed
to meet the requisite standard of proofafter a full trial. I
would remandthe case for entry of judgmentin favorof Price
Waterhouse.

